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THE CRISIS OF THE AMERICAN
CONSTITUTION

DR.

WILLIAM YANDELL ELLIOTT

President Bryan, Ladies and Gentlemen:

It is a very generous yet a difficult introduction
that your President has given me. I come back with
great pleasure to William and Mary, and yet I always
face an introduction by President Bryan with a certain
amount of trepidation-to say nothing of your camera
flashlights! I am enough of a Southerner to recognize
the real oratorical tradition when I hear it, and you have
been just listening to it in your President's introduction.
What he said to you about my remarks I can at least
bear out in the analysis that he has made as to what I
think the crisis of the Constitution is: It is fundamentally a crisis of American citizenship-a crisis of citizenship in a world which is very rapidly turning to those
religions of the State that he has just described in
such moving words.
After all, the crisis is not for us, as that of Rome
is, the crisis of a dead culture. I am standing at the
present moment in the middle of a College which
contributed, I dare say, more than any other educational institution in the country to the formation
and development of the Constitution of the United
States. I don't have to recite to you the fact that no
less than four of your own students took part in that
convention; that the Virginia plan, which was the very
basis of the whole document, proceeded from the
hands of William and Mary me,n, notably Randolph
and Wythe; nor that McClurg and Blair, through
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that long session contributed a maturity of wisdom to
all the discussions. The development of that document
into a living Constitution at the hands of Wythe's
student John Marshall is a great tribute to the tradition that William and Mary had built up even at
that early time in our country. As a professor at
Harvard I suppose I ought to feel some shame by the
implied comparison of this record; but as a Southerner
I rejoice in it. And, it is a peculiar pleasure to find
that tradition is today still maintained under a leadership as inspiring as you have here in your Wythe
School of Citizenship; and that Southerners in particular, and Virginians most especially, are concerned
today with what is happening to the Nation and what
is happening to its fundamental charter.
After all, tIle Constitution of the United States
is a symbol of our own national life and being. We
have not a king or a crown nor do we want them.
George Washington might readily I think maintain
that the Constitution is what he hoped it would be:
"Let us raise a standard," he said to the convention
over which he presided, "to which the wise and the
just may repair. The event is in the hand of God."
We know now from recently presented historical
evidence that many members of that convention
wished to make Washington a sort of uncrowned
King-a strong man to restore unity to the distracted
confederation. He might have turned the country in
that Cromwellian direction. He put by the chance
to become a Caesar, as he always put by temptations
of that sort. He inaugurated a republic in the country
that we now live in, dedicated to the principles that
constitution stands for.
One of the great principles of the makers of our
Constitution was a frequent recurrence to funda-
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mentals. Let us to-day fearlessly follow their example.
But first it is important in a time like this that we
take some stock of our own situation in the world
we live in. We are always talking about "times of
crisis," but surely there was never a better justification for those words than at the present moment. I
remember a toast that the French Ambassador to
Washington, M. Claudel, who was a considerable poet
among other things, proposed way back in the daysit seems way back, now!-in the days of the Hoover
Moratorium,-when the French were hoping to get
rid of the burden of the War Debt. He proposed a
toast: "Here's to the little pause between the crisis
and the catastrophe, for we live in it,"-and we do.
A Frenchman today must have that feeling in a
sense that he has not had since the days of 1914, and
he may have reason to feel that the present crisis is
even more dangerous to the inner life of France than
the shock and trial of the grea t War. An Englishman,
sitting uneasily on about a fourth · of the World's
useful land surface,-a fifth of its total land surface
perhaps, and in an empire that rules about a fourth of
the World's population, that controls most of the
great natural resources that lie outside the boundaries
of the United States and Soviet Russia,-the lion's
share as is well said,-an Englishman today, must
have a deep feeling of insecurity for that empire.
Perhaps that uneasiness penetrates even beneath the
smug level that has been bred up by generations of
mastership in the world, for he must know that his
empire is being tested; and that whether or not it is to
follow the courses of other empires of history will very
largely depend on the decisions that are being made at
this very time.
The democracies of the whole world are on the
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defensive. The timing of the brutal and absolutely
ruthless thrusts that are being made at one point or
another by the unholy trinity of the dictatorships of
the "have-not" powers is a matter that must give concern to anyone who views the future of the world and
asks whether the principles to which we are dedicated
as a nation can endure. Yet these are the principles
for which our Constitution stands, which our daily
life permits us to enjoy-freedom of thought in school,
in university and college; that amiable kind of citizenship with its give and take, which lives and lets live,
tolerating differences of opinion and arriving at settlements through political rather than violent means.
It is that freedom which permits me to stand before
this microphone and express sentiments that are absolutely uncensored by anyone. I tell you those
things {lre in danger in the world.
Nor is it simply that they are in danger abroad.
The reason I say that they are in danger at home is
this: in a time of world crisis, such as the one in which
we are living, the very nature of Government undergoes a profound change, just as it does during a war,
and to almost the same degree. The underlying
sense of insecurity in which people exist breeds that
change within every nation. We are readily accustomed
to talking about recessions, depressions. We take
more or less for granted the typical character of the
recurrence of these periods in which want follows
prosperity. It is an old story, in something of the
fashion that Joseph saw in his interpretation of Pharaoh's dream, "though Heaven knows we have not had
the seven fat years yet! But, those things go very
deep when hundreds of thousands, and hundreds of
millions of people, taken over the world as a whole,
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are feeling disturbed and at a loss to know how to
make honest effort count.
The very nature of our industrial processes brings
the necessity of organization on so large a scale as, I
am convinced, we must have for the benefits of modern
mass production. I don't believe we can go back,break up at this time that large scale organization
which we have built up in this country both for research and for marketing, and, for that matter, for the
security of labor itself. The nostalgia for small scale
business and for an agrarian simplicity is understandable. It has a romantic appeal. But it is a flight from
reality in our present day world. It is frequently
the case that large scale organizations have a better
ability to plan and to forecast and to produce with the
efficient division of labor. I don't mean that the
existence of giant corporations in every branch of
American industry is either essential or desirable. But
I do mean that we are living in a super-industrial
civilization which we can no more reject than King
Canute could stop the tide from coming up. If we
did reject it, we would be trampled down in the march
of civilization by nations which were prepared to
master that great beast, the machine, and go on.
I belonged in the years just before and after the
World War to a group of youngsters who used to consider themselves poets, in the South, the Fugitive
Group as they called themselves. Many of them have
achieved national reputations to-day, well deserved.
In later days they have been crusading against the
machine in the interest of agrarianism. Books like
"I'll Take My Stand" have been succeeded by "The
Land of the Free," etc. I like farms-I support a farm
myself-it doesn't support me; I support it. I suspect
that most farming by those who prefer the agranan
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gospel today is like that. If you are able to afford it.
I am convinced that farming, "gentlemanly" farming if
possible, is the good way of life. But I don't believe
we can reverse the hands of the clock and turn backward. We have got to learn how to master the kind of
machine civilization we are living in. And that machine
civilization, because it has taken away the tools of
production from the individual, has created a profound sense of insecurity that can only be managed
socially through' social security, through collective
effort, and I dare say, on a national scale.
Now that is the first thing: We face an irresistible
demand, an internal demand for social security, and
on a national scale. Where is our federalism, our
indestructible union of indestructible states? The
question is rhetorical but the answer is painfully plain:
The states are in Washington, hat in hand, asking for
more relief and getting it at the price of a more centralized, a more national system.
Yet the external aspects of this matter are even
more threatening if you consider them honestly. What
are the ultimate objectives of the dictatorial systems of
the "have-nots" in this world? Can they be placated by
concessions that will undo the Treaty of Versailles,
which we are all glad to see go down the drain? Is
Hitler to be satisfied, as so many of England's ruling
class seem to think, with a slice, oh only a very tiny
slice, of their Colonial empire? Will Mussolini, for example, remain quiet in the act of attempting to digest,
rather like a boa constrictor, the somewhat huge bites of
territory that he has taken to himself in Ethiopia and
the ones that he undoubtedly contemplates taking
in Spain and northern Africa,, whether by influence
or directly so, is of little matter? Will Japan bog
down in China, as many people think, and remain
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bogged down and be rendered helpless? I doubt very
much that this happy inertia of the sated will be the
outcome, if the "have-nots" get their way. Wishful
thinking would lead-me to hope it, but I believe there
is a profound inner cause of self destruction in these
systems: Dictators who have promised their nations
the moon, can never stop arming to get it. They are
driven on by an inner compulsion, always farther and
farther. Every concession that is given them merely
whets the appetite for more, because the dictator must
release the dissatisfactions that grow up under the
tightening of the belt inside the nation. Instead of
butter, he gives his people cannon-painful substitutes.
Rearming comes out of the lowered power of consumption of his people. He must release their resentment by
turning to outside enemies when he no longer has inside the sca pegoa t of Jews or something of that sort,
and scapegoats don't last forever. In other words,
the very nature of that planned system of totalitarianism leads on and on into a world of "living dangerously" in which there is no end to the road but war.
Machiavelli put it and Mussolini today re-echoes it:
"Expand or perish." I don't think the "or" is the proper
conjunction. It should be "Expand and Perish" and
tha t will mean the destruction of a great part of what
we know as Western civilization in the holocaust.
Now, what is our situation in the United States, confronted by tha t kind of a picture? We see the weakening of all those barriers, which we have been inclined to
take for granted, of our own ultimate security. That fact
comes closer home every day in Latin America and in
Central America and in Mexico. We are beginning to feel
repercussions from the drive of these hungry powers in
regions that lie well within the sphere we are accustomed
to treating as being protected by the Monroe Doctrine.
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And what is more than that, the contagion of the
idea of dictatorships is abroad; and there is a contagion
in ideas. When people feel profoundly insecure in their
daily lives; when through inflation a middle class has
been wiped out; when a nation has suffered humiliation,
and wishes to forget it or to escape from it in dreams and
delusions of grandeur; when it feels the futility of its
own political institutions, that nation is ripe for a
dictatorship. We do not believe-I do not believe,
those conditions exist in the United States today.
We are not leaderless in the United States; we have
not gone through the wringer of inflation and I pray
that we may be spared it-though one of the points I
am trying to make today is that we must look into the
fundamentals of our constitutional system in order
to spare ourselves. Nor do I believe that we are
humiliated,-on the contrary we are perhaps the
cockiest people in the world-too much so I think.
We agree on our superiority among ourselves and would
like others to be able to see it, too. We don't know
what it is to be licked in a war. If we were licked, we
wouldn't know it, even then. It was only the fact
that we didn't know we were licked in the War of
1812-1815 that enabled some of my own tribe to lug
their long rifles down to New Orleans and lick the
British after the Treaty of Peace had been signed.
We don't suffer from the kind of an inferiority complex that is conditioning the action of Germany,
Japan, Italy and many other nations.
And we haven't the feeling of futility about our
political institutions. Perhaps when we begin to pay
our bills we may feel otherwise.
But there are some aspects of these threats that
come home to us from both fronts, the inner front
and the outer front. When the world is re-arming,
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as it is today all over the world, it means that ordinarily we get into a state of war psychosis where
fear dominates every action. We haven't come to
that point yet. But we are passing bills, and rightly
passing bills in my judgment, in the billions of dollars,
for naval defense and for armies. We are straining the
resources of our system, though not yet to the point
that the British and French are doing, to get ready for
"the day." There is already an "M" Day Bill in
Congress, a Mobilization Day Bill-rather wrongly
called a bill "to take the profits out of war". This
la tter pious aim figures in the last part of the bill and
only in terms of something "for future study." But
that bill would set up something like a totalitarian
state in this country. I think possibly it would have
to, during a war. We did something of the same sort in
a modest way during the last war. Am I wrong then
in feeling that the shadow of war hangs very heavily
over this nation today?
Mind you, I don't regard the Byrnes Bill for the
administrative reorganization of our federal services,
that has been so bitterly and, I daresay, maliciously,
assailed, as in any way containing the possible threat of
dictatorship. I want to put myself on record on that
and come back to it. On the contrary, it is merely
giving to the Executive of the United States those
powers that under the Constitution he must have to execute faithfully the law, and which under the Articles of
the Constitution governing the separation of powers,
any President needs and must have. They are powers
which President after President, as Mr. Hoover was
honest enough to say the other day, has tried to get in
vain from Congress, because of the nature of our pressure politics and spoils system. From Taft's time on,
every President of the United States has been rebuffed.
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I say I don't regard the Reorganization Bill as a threat,
but I do point to you that the nations that are headed
toward war are going to have to alter their forms of
government in order to centralize power. A nation preparing for war, a war on poverty or a war against
external enemies -is like an army: there has to be staff
work. The idea of a "general staff" inevitably begins to
function in government under those conditions. Unless we can meet these demands under democratic,
and Consititutional terms we may one day find ourselves meeting them under quite other · terms. In
other words, in my judgment, it is better to anticipate
and to prevent this trend from getting out of hand, if
we are to maintain the constitutional tradition that
the men of this College attempted to establish when
they put into effect in that final crisis that they were
facing, the Virginia plan for national government that
could govern and could govern responsibly.
Now, how is this to be done? What are the things
that we face today in our constitutional system that
are threatened-what remedies can we take?
I want to suggest that our system needs revision
today first in respect to our federal units of government
and second by bridging the gulf between President and
Congress by means of a general election.
First of all, what is the American Constitution
that I have been talking about here? Many of you
may think that I mean only the document that came
out of the Constitutional Convention. That document was ratified by conventions in the states after
long and very brilliant and interesting debates and a
rather bitter struggle, and it has been amended
twenty-one times, and will be still further amended,
I hope. No, I mean something more even than that.
I mean the constitutional system of the United States
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as it works. That is the true constitution of any
country: the working system that has grown up about
fundamental law.
There is nothing in the Constitution whatever
that says the President shall be elected in the way that
he .is. The Electoral College has been gradually
changed by usage into agents who are absolutely
instructed-delegates and not men with individual
discretion. You may regard that, and I do regard it,
as perhaps a mistake. But it has happened. The
usages of our Constitution, the practices, and there are
many of them, determine what the system is and how
it works.
One of the most important of those usages is the
power of the judiciary in the system, which I think
was intended by the men of the Constitutional Convention, to function as a protection of genuine fundamentals, but not in the extreme form of judicial
censorship that it has become at times in our history.
The power of judicial review was, in my judgment,
and I have placed a good deal of study on thatdeliberately intended, but I don't think it was ever
intended that the judges should set themselves up as
censors of all social policies. The early justices said
that in the clearest language, in decisions of about
1795. Chase and Cushing put it very well, in terms
about like this: We ought to remember that the
right to declare a law unconstitutional, if it exists in
our system [and it had not yet been exercised at that
time] in respect to a Federal law should be exercised
"only in a very clear case." That is an important
self-denying ordinance which I recommend to the
judiciary and which I think the judiciary is probably
going to follow in times to come in this country.
Subject to that reservation, I think that there is no
[ 13 ]

more important bulwark of our liberties than an independent judiciary. It is one of the things that is
regularly attacked by every dictatorship in order to
bring law under arbitrary control.
While I could sympathize with the distress that
Mr. Roosevelt felt at the kind of decisions that the
majority of the Supreme Court were giving him a
year or two ago, I did not feel sympathy with the
method by which he proposed to remedy them, and I
think the same feeling of uneasiness about the use of
a round-about method of what amounted to packing
the Court, was a very sound indication of the attachment of Americans to their Constitutional system.
Now, the crisis has for the moment passed. It
leaves behind it though certain questions which I
should like to raise with you about the future of the
judiciary. Our Constitutional System is not only
what the judges say it is, but what the amending
power can make it, and what usage will make it.
Today I want to lay before you the suggestion that
what we have to avoid is changing our whole system
just by usage-by usurpation, by the necessity of twisting
a document into distortion. We need, on the contrary,
to bring to bear upon its orderly and constitutional
amendment, in certain features, the best thought that
this country can produce, and the same kind of effort
that went into its creation a hundred and fifty years
ago.
Of course there are still parts of this country that
don't believe that this is a nation even today. Virginia, the Old Dominion, I think is no longer one of
them. We have, I think throughout the South,
generally speaking, accepted the fact that we are a
nation. Not that the Civil War settled that for us.
But our acceptance of national unity arose from a
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growing conviction that has come about through our
own contribution to the nation. If there is a part of
the country today that is secessionist it is probably
in New England, and most particularly in Vermont
and Maine. (I trust they will not hear in Boston over
these air waves the remarks I have just made!)
But this is a federal country in spite of being a
nation, and the protection of the rights of the states
and of the reality of those rights depends upon having
in the working of the State governments the possibility of solving the problems that those state governments have before them. That is the first main point
in the actual work of our constitutional system that I
raise to discuss with you. Can we, through the existing mechanism of the states, hope to have areas adequate, politically and economically, to the burdens
put upon them? Isn't it precisely the fact that those
areas are not grouped in a way that is adequate to
that purpose which is fatally transferring everything
to Washington,-a tendency that I certainly feel is
very dangerous. But I don't see any remedy for it as
long as we are dealing with areas like the states in
their present form. New England is a real area
today, and it would be most useful there (I can say
it here; I hope that my voice is not carried by this
microphone back there), it would be most useful to
have the city of Boston, for instance, dominated by a
New England region rather than have the city of
Boston politically dominating the politics of the
Commonwealth of Massachusetts to the degree that
it does. It will be most necessary, perhaps, in the
future of our country to get the great metropolitan
areas of this country balanced and perhaps overbalanced by back-country. But I daresay, from my
backwoods Tennessee point of view, if you don't
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mind, President Bryan, the great part of this country
outside the few largest cities is sounder in American
tradition than the metropolitan areas are ever likely to
be, though New York seems to be on the up grade.
In that respect, I am afraid that I share somewhat
Jefferson's distrust of urbanization. I think the
problem of dealing with urbanization is very largely
a problem of balancing the political powers of this
country in regional groups large enough to do the job.
The problem isn't an acute one for you in Virginia.
You have the oldest tradition of any state, perhaps,
except Massachusetts, and there you will be rivaled.
You have not the problems that Massachusetts has
inherited because of the potato famine in Ireland
almost a century ago and other things that I needn't
go into.
Bu t you are also Americans, as well as Virginians,
and you recognize the fact that these problems exist,
and that it may well be that the existing grouping of
our Federal units is one of the large reasons why we
are drifting to such a degree of centralization. Both
because the cities have too much weight in the national
political picture at the present time-because of a few
great city machines,-and because the existing territorial areas of the states, as constituted at present,
are not natural economic units, we need to consider
a radical change in the basis of our federalism.
Carter Glass, in drawing up the Federal Reserve
System-a feat of great constitutional statesmanship
that we must never forget, for which he ought to be
eternally honored,-had some sort of picture like this
before him-those twelve districts. This is an important matter for our study. I am not going to try
here to lay down the criteria for settling the outlines
of these new Federal Regions that seem necessary for a
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sound federalism. The Federal Reserve Districts suggest to my mind, to a considerable degree, the need of
areas that would transcend the barriers of the states
sufficiently to have large enough grouping to play the
role that once Massachusetts and Virginia played, and
which no doubt Massachusetts and Virginia would to
some degree still lead in any such regional group. We
need political units comprised of regions homogeneous
to some degree in culture and in their way of looking at
things-that is essential in a federal country. The
South, you see, splits itself up into units of this sort.
You know as I do that there is a genuine difference of
feeling between parts of the South that are just below the Mason-Dixon line and some that are very
much below the Mason-Dixon line. I don't think
I need to specify further than to say that Huey Long
is a phenomenon which could not have happened in
Virginia.
Now, let's take my second main point: the separation of powers in our system. We started off with a
conviction about the separation of powers which was
partly due to some misconception of the English system
that we got through Blackstone and that he had inherited in some degree through Montesquieu,-that the
English system really was one of separated powers.
At the time they wrote, it was a far more genuine separation of powers than historical critics are prepared to
admit. After all, George III did run a good deal of the
executive power of England. In spite of what people
said, in the light of later constitutional procedents,
he was powerful. Our colonial experience also led us
into accepting the reasoning that to separate the
executive, legislative and judicial functions was to
prevent them from falling into the hands of a single
and therefore an arbitrary person. The presidency
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was set up on an entirely separate basis from Congress.
The two ends of the Avenue in Washington are significantly two ends of the Avenue-Pennsylvania
Avenue. If you want to get them together today,
how do you go about it? Well, I am afraid we must
confess the fact that the separation of powers in this
United States of America is bridged by "patronage"
and "spending." Am I wrong about that? I don't
think so. Sometimes there are presidents who do not
feel inclined to bridge it in that way. They won't
"play ball with the boys," and they don't get to the
first base, politically, if I may express the plain fact in
that way. Mr. Hoover had that difficulty, to a degree.
He didn't have the technique that had been developed
in Al Smith and in Franklin Roosevelt by dealing
with state legislatures.
There is this significant fact about the history
of our country which I want to call to your attention
on the authority of the late Will Rogers, who was a
very considerable critic of our institutions, as well as
a great humorist. According to Will, there was no
president after Jackson, at any rate, who managed to
control his Congress throughout his entire term of
office. He said the possible exception to that statement-and you may disagree with him, but you think
about it pretty hard and I believe you will find Will
was right-the possible exception to it, he said, was
Calvin Coolidge: The reason was that if "Cal" did
know what was on his own mind, he never told anybody; so Congress could not find out in order to
block him.
Well, it is like that. Being president of the
United States is like driving a balky mule. When
Al Smith came up to dine with the Forty Harvard
Thieves, as we were locally known-Ali Baba Smith
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and the Forty Harvard Thieves-after his defeat in
1928, those of us who had signed a manifesto for him
talked over with him this feature of our system that
Will Rogers had commented on. I told him the story,
at that time, of the negro and the ice wagon and the
balky mule, which must be a classic down here-it
certainly is in Tennessee-that I think profoundly
illustra~es the character of our political system in this
respect: The separation of powers between the
President and Congress. It is about Jim, who drives
the ice-wagon for Mr. Hogan, the local ice-man.
Jim resigns after the mule has balked in the public
square in front of the court house. He calls up Mr.
Hogan on the telephone to inform his boss. After a
long conversation, in which Jim recounts · the catastrophes which befell various helpful by-standers who
thought that they could budge the mule, Jim finally
gets to the point: "Yassuh, Mistah Hogan! I done
tried that, too. Yassuh. I built a fiah under dat
mule. Yassuh she moved, she sho moved. She
moved just bout fifteen feet, Mr. Hogan, and burnt up
de ice wagon!"
I want to put it to you that our experience with
everything that we have tried in the way of the
executive budget and the other devices for strengthening the hold of the executive on the legislature, and for
getting mutual responsibility has so far resulted in
that end: The legislature moves up about fifteen feet
and burns up the ice wagon! I don't suggest that
Governor Smith's only qualifications for the presidency were that he could drive the balky mule. Not
at all. Diplomacy in getting along with the Legislature
is essential under any conditions, and the Legislature
has good reasons to criticize the executive and hold
him to account-that is the essential part of parlia[ 19 ]

mentary government wherever it exists in a true
form in the world today. But there must be a relationship between these two that is more organic
in its responsibilities than any thing we have yet
worked out if we are ever to get a civil service.
I have backed the Byrnes' Reorganization Bill and
I think it is a good job. It blankets a lot of people in
the civil service, and you will never get them there
in any other way. I hope it will keep them in the civil
service but I haven't very much confidence that it
will. I don't believe that under our system any
President with a change of party is ever going to
forego the weapon of patronage that he has to use in
order to hold his party in line. If there weren't a
Mr. Farley in each party you would have to create
one, Democratic or Republican. You know the nature
of politics as well as I do in that respect. You can't
make our administration work, under the present
separation of powers, without patronage and spending.
How could you make it work? Well, I want to
suggest to you at least a thought on that matter.
I think, first of all, an item veto for the President is a
very desirable thing. It strengthens his hands against
"riders" that is, bills of an entirely different character
that are attached to bills which he must accept. E. g.,
the Miller-Tydings Bill, which you mayor may not
support, but which will cost you money in preventing
prices from being cut on trade-marked and copyrighted
articles, was federal legislation allowing price-fixing of
that sort to be sanctioned by the states which have
passed such legislation. That bill was passed as a
rider to the District of Columbia Appropriation Bill
which Mr. Roosevelt had to sign or see the Government starve.
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When we are talking about executive dictatorships, let's think a little bit about the other side of
responsibility. What is it you are trying to get in your
system ? You hold the President responsible for doing
things. What do you want him to do? What machinery do you equip him with to do it? Do you demand that he go to the radio and have a fireside chat
and that the country react one way or another and
that telegrams to Congress will register results? It
is a very bad way of having a general election. Father
Coughlin and others seem to use that technique to
better advantage than the great and rather inarticulate
masses of our people who vote only on election day.
We don't-most of us-get around to sending telegrams to Congress, and it isn't, in any case, the way
to settle issues of this sort. Yet today, it is the only
way that we have and we have to try to work it.
No doubt it is very nice for the telegraph companies.
Pressure politics become characteristic of a system
in which minorities really put the screws on our
representatives. In that respect, ladies and gentlemen, I raise this serious question with you: Have
not the institutions of our political systems developed into this type of pressure politics largely because of the separation of powers which prevents
the responsibility of disciplined party control? The
Senate, for instance, is a hotbed of minority and
group and bloc action. It is not a majority organ
or under party control. I raise the question as to
whether or not that must be corrected if we are not to
develop a distrust of our institutions, a feeling of
futility, a sense that Congress has become a log-rolling
body.
But there is the other side of the picture. You
must protect Congress,-that's all there is to it.
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As citizens you must protect Congress if it is to protect you. If you were in Congress (or I were there)
you or I would have to make peace with this same
kind of pressure. At the back of the trouble with our
system lies the fact that we are subsidizing everybody.
We are bringing to bear in government the kind of
pressure that makes it impossible to have a balanced
budget and a responsible system. I think that, in
President Bryan's words, that's the failure of citizenship. It comes back to a fundamental that we don't
think of government as a community interest, but as
something like a grab-bag. How do you treat your
repesesentative in Congress ? You have a good tradition in Virginia and I can exempt you from the worst
of our "pork-barrel" politics. But it is far too often in
every part of the country, and I can speak with some
knowledge, a matter of what the Congressman or the
Senator has "done for the district" that determines
whether he will stay in politics. And above all he must
make no enemies.
Now I am an American and I am concerned with
what happens through organized pressures of groups
like labor and bankers and cotton growers, and other
people who run our country to some degree in terms of
response to pressures, without framing policy in the
"public" interest. I want to point out to you that the
public interest is the thing which the men who created
the Constitution were concerned to protect. Now, it
can be protected in several different methods. It
can be protected by the Court, which will hold people
to the settled rules of the game, and it ought to be
protected by the Court as long as the court is enforcing those rules and not making them. And I think
today that the Court is in a fair way to do that. I
would like to suggest that if the Court had the power
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of rendering advisory opmlOns or speeding up its
opinions, we would get a great deal more speed as
well as security in our law.
In the second place, the "public interest" can
be protected by an executive who has an item veto,
to some degree at least. So armed, he can delete
"riders" and protect his own budget. But in my
judgment, that executive sooner or later has to have
the right to appeal to his country as a whole. If he
had the right to call a general election, he wouldn't
need patronage and spending to bribe his party into
line. In England, the Cabinet doesn't have patronage.
They do have a balanced budget. Why? Because the
Prime Minister can say to the members of his party,
either we go along together or we face the country
and you ask them whether they back you or me.
That's democracy. Sooner or later this country has
got to find some way of dealing with our political
questions in order to get the public interest registered
by a genuine majority under constitutional restraint.
In our system the President should have the right to
call such an election once during his term. If he lost
it, he should lose also his veto powers. If he resigned,
his successor should be selected by Congress. I am
convinced that the men who wrote the Constitution
in the main viewed with alarm the equal powers of
the long-term and small-state Senate over money bills,
which has been one of the biggest opportunities for
jobbery, for pressure politics and for throwing budgets
out of balance and for that kind of thing. The Senate's
powers over taxing and spending should be subordinated to those of the House.
.
I am presenting to you what, I believe, is not the
usual analysis of the troubles of our constitutional
system. But I ask you, in all honesty as Americans,
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to consider whether these troubles, in times and under
pressures such as we now see working from within
and without, don't transcend parties or personalitieswhether they don't coerce any President into a line
of conduct that will make him ultimately do things
tha t will be distressful to you and to me as American
citizens; or- alternatively, make him lose his hold. I
ask you whether we haven't a real question in our
Constitution to consider, as to the nature of our system
of states, given the present drift toward handing
everything over to Washington. Let us organize our
system better; let the citizens support it better, and
above all, let us see that the changes that are made
in it be made lawfully and by constitutional methods,
in order that we can hand down through these difficult
times the priceless heritage that the Constitution of
the Unites States is to the American people.
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